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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

TAXATION - INCOME TAX - IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY LESSEE AS
INCOME TO LESSOR - In 1915, defendant leased a tract of land to X for
ninety-nine years. The lease provided that the lessee could remove the old
building and replace it; and that on termination, the lessee should surrender
the land, buildings and improvements. In 1929, the lessee razed the old structure and erected a new one. On default by the lessee in 1933, the lease was
cancelled and defendant repossessed the premises. The commissioner of internal ·
revenue determined that the difference between the fair market value of the
new building in 1933 and the unamortized cost of the building razed in 1929
was taxable to defendant as net gain for l 933. The board of tax appeals overruled the contention of the commissioner, and the circuit court of appeals affirmed. Held, reversed. As it was not shown what type of building was erected,
nor whether the difference in value so found accurately reflected the increase
in the land and building as a single estate, the· presumption of correctness of the
commissioner's determination was not overcome. Even assuming that the difference did reflect that increase, defendant still realized a taxable gain in I 933.
Helvenng v. Bru11,n, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 631.
When a lessee places improvements upon land, title to which vests in the
lessor, there are three possible points at which it could be argued that the lessor
realizes income; viz., on completion of the improvements, on termination of
the lease, and on disposal of the improved property.1 The first of these possi-

1 A dispute has raged on this question for years between the commissioner and
the board of tax appeals on one side and the lower courts and the taxpayer on the
other. For a history of that dispute, see 37 M1cH. L. REv. IIII (1939); 87 UNiv.
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bilities was eliminated in 1938 by the Supreme Court in a carefully limited
decision holding that, under the facts presented, the lessor realized no income
upon the completion of the improvements. 2 This left open the question as to
which of the other two was the proper time. Just when the circuit courts of
appeal had reached a semblance of unanimity in holding that the lessor realized
no income on the termination of the lease, 8 the present case determines that it is
precisely at this point that the lessor does realize income. That the lessor is
benefited by the improvements would seem to be unquestionable. The trouble
is in determining when that benefit is realized so as to be taxable income. There
is a serious question whether there is income within the Sixteenth Amendment
when the untrammeled title to such improvements vests in the lessor.4 It was
said that "as a result of a business transaction, the respondent received back his
land with a new building on it, which added an ascertainable amount to its
value. It is not necessary to recognition of taxable gain that he should be able
to sever the improvement begetting the gain from his original capital." 5 It is
now settled that a tax on income from property is a direct tax 6 and that the
Sixteenth Amendment only removed the necessity of apportionment of such a
tax.7 To come within the intendment of that amendment,8 it would seem that
the gain should be sufficiently distinct from the land so that the tax does not
partake of the nature of a tax on the land itself. The language of the present
case is certainly a far cry from that used in Eisner 'll. Macomber,9 where the
PA. L. REv. 489 (1939); 24 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 563 (1939); 8 BROOKLYN L. REv.
215 (1938); 27 GEORGETOWN L. J. 500 (1939); 24 lowA L. REv. 613 (1939).
2
M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U. S. 267, 59 S. Ct. 186 (1938), discussed in "the law review articles cited in note 1.
8
The present case below, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 442; Commissioner
v. Center Inv. Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 190; Nicholas v. Fifteenth
Street Inv. Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 289; Commissioner v. Wood,
(C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 869, reversed per curiam on the strength of the
Bruun case, Helvering v. Wood, 308 U.S. 543, 60 S. Ct. 807 (1940).
4 Defendant here maintained "that the economic gain consequent upon the enhanced value of the recaptured asset is not gain derived from capital or realized within
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and may not, therefore, be taxed without
apportionment." Principal case, 60 S. Ct. 63 l at 634.
5 60 S. Ct. 631 at 634-635. The statutory basis for the tax is that such income is
within the definition of gross income of § 22 (a), Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
53 Stat. L. 9, as amended 53 Stat. L. 574, 575. For citations of earlier similar provisions, see 26 U. S. C. A. (1940), p. 49.
6 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912 (1895).
7 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry., 240 U. S. 1, 36 S. Ct. 236 (1916).
8 The Sixteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
0
252 U.S. 189 at 207, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920): "Here we have the essential
matter: not a goi.n accruing to capital, not a growth. or increment or value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the
property, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in,
being 'derived,' that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his
separate use, benefit and disposal;-that is income derived from property. Nothing else
answers the description." (Italics the Court's.)
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emphasis was clearly and expressly placed on severability, and it is even a departure
from that used in M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States. 10 The Court attempted to
distinguish the Macomber case by saying that the language there used was only
to emphasize the difference between a cash dividend and a stock dividend, hence
it was not controlling on the facts presented. On reading the Macomber case,
such a distinction is wholly unsatisfactory. It would seem clear that Justice
Pitney did not think, when he emphasized the words "Derived-from-capital," 11 that he was only pointing out the difference in the types of dividends,
but rather, that he was laying down a criterion by which it could be determined
at what point an increment in the capital investment became income so as to
be taxable without apportionment within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. The government would lose no revenue properly belonging to it if it
was held that there was no income realized until a disposal of the improved
property, for in the interim the increased rentals received by the lessor because
of the improvements would be taxable. If, under the present case, the increase
in rental attributable to the imp,rovements is considered income, and certainly
it will be, there results an anomaly in that there is income derived from income
without the necessity of reinvesting the income first received. It might be interesting to ask at this point what the lessor has received from which he could
pay the tax imposed.12 The answer is obvious. Whatever may be the practical
results of this decision, it is clear that the Court has promulgated a definition of
income which is peculiarly adaptable to the present case.13 There is a doubtful
wisdom in adopting a policy whereby empiric definitions, applicable to the
particular facts presented, are to be preferred over a general definition of income
which enjoys the sanctions of time and experience.
Benjamin W. Franklin
10 305 U. S. 267 at 279, 59 S. Ct. 186 (1938): "Granting that the improvements increased the value of the building, that enhancement is not realized income
of the lessor. So far as concerns taxable income, the value of the improvements is not
distinguishable from excess, if any there may be, of value over cost of improvements
made by lessor. Each was an addition to capital; not income within the meaning of the
statute. Treasury Regulations can add nothing to income as defined by Congress."
However, the Court did later qualify this by saying that "assuming that at some time
value of the improvements would be income of lessor, it cannot be reasonably assigned
to the year in which they were installed." Ibid., 305 U. S. at 280. The decision is
further weakened by Justice Stone's refusal to join in that part of the opinion.
11 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 at 207, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920) (italics
supplied by the Court).
12 This question was raised in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct.
189· (1920), and in Commissioner v. Wood, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 869
(1939), ·reversed per curiam Helvering v. Wood, 308 U. S. 543, 60 S. Ct. 807
(1940).
13 It is regrettable to state that the application of this case is already beclouded.
In the present case, the commissioner assessed as income the difference between the
present fair market value of the new building and the unamortized cost of the old
one. In Commissioner v. Wood, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 869, reversed
per curiam Helvering v. Wood, 308 U.S. 543, 60 S. Ct. 807 (1940), the income was
assessed as the difference between the market value of the new building and the
unamortized value. As of what date this value is determined is not made clear.

